Abstract-Wireless sensor and actuator network applications require several levels of testing during their development.
INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor and actuator network (WS&AN) is a wireless ad-hoc network that is able to collect information on the physical world, process the data and perform appropriate actions based on the decisions made. Although WS&ANs attract much attention for military applications, they are now used in many civilian applications such as environment and habitat monitoring, healthcare applications and traffic control.
A WS&AN comprises intelligent sensing and actuation devices, called sensor and actuator nodes respectively and one or more gateway nodes. Sensor nodes contain a small processor, sensors, a means of communicating wirelessly and a power source, usually a battery. They are therefore resource-constrained with limited processing power, limited memory and restricted energy. Sensing and actuation may also be combined in a single device. The constraints around wireless sensor and actuator nodes mean that they require lightweight radio technologies and protocols. Dedicated gateways are needed to interface WS&ANs into wider IP networks. An example of a WS&AN deployment is shown in Figure 1 .
While WS&ANs offer many new research opportunities, they also pose many challenges. WS&ANs are potentially very large scale and can consist of hundreds or thousands of sensor nodes. The network topology can also change rapidly, due to intermittent nodes connectivity and node failure, caused by resource constraints. In addition, WS&ANs are also prone to faults in the hardware or communications, leading to errors and delays in both data and communications. As the sensor and actuator node technology improves, WS&ANs are able to provide not only raw data, but also more complex applications and middleware, from simple alarm-based networks to complex collaborative decision-making. These generate dynamic traffic patterns in the network, which are dependent on the physical environment events being sensed and are controlled over time. Such applications will require several levels of testing during their development and deployment to ensure that applications can tolerate real wireless network capacity and performance in the field, as well as topology changes and faults. Although software algorithms can be checked through simulations and syntax checking, it is difficult to predict or test for all problems that may occur. Therefore, a means for testing the application during all stages of its lifecycle is needed.
Furthermore, complex applications allow WS&ANs to implement business logic and become integrated with business processes, which will require the WS&ANs to be submitted to Quality Assurance procedures. Services provided by WS&ANs could even be traded, as proposed in the SENSEI project [1] , requiring mechanisms for validating the ongoing performance of the full system. Therefore, there is an increasing need for full lifecycle testing of WS&AN applications, in order to verify that they are operating as expected throughout their deployment.
To address the need for full lifecycle testing, we propose a framework to deliver an in-situ integrity check. During an integrity check, the sensor inputs and actuator responses are emulated within the physical WS&AN. The framework allows application-level testing by invoking integrity checks, feeding controlled information to the sensor inputs, while data processing, communication, aggregation and decision making continue as normal across the physical WS&AN. The framework ensures that, while synthetic and real data are treated in the same way by the WS&AN, the two are unambiguously differentiated at the gateway. The integrity check allows the operator to verify that the WS&AN is working as expected and making the correct decisions. It is particularly important for testing the WS&AN response during rare or hazardous events, especially in safety-critical deployments and applications. For example, emulated sensor data could be used to simulate a hazardous alarm condition such as a fire within a building. The IntegrityChecking Framework could also be used to confirm that in network processing algorithms are producing expected outputs for a given set of sensor inputs when deployed in the field.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the state-of-the-art techniques for testing WS&AN applications and provides an overview of the related work. The proposed in-situ testing framework is introduced in Section 3 and Section 4 describes the architecture of the Integrity-Checking Framework. Conclusions and further work are described in Section 5.
II. RELATED WORK
Validation of a WS&AN application is necessary to ensure that the system operates as intended, not only in the development phase, but also in the wider operational lifecycle, as complexity increases in the network. We are not concerned here with optimising functionality but rather with testing whether a system design is working correctly at the application level. Application-level validation approaches to verify the correct operation of devices and code can broadly be divided into two categories: testing and monitoring.
A. Testing
During testing, parts of the WS&AN are controlled or stimulated to examine the response of the network. There are three main approaches: simulation, hardware testbeds and hybrid-physical simulation.
Simulation-based techniques use software to model parts or features of the system and operating environment. Simulation can occur at various levels of the protocol stack:
• Link-level testing, e.g., RF simulation • Network-level testing of routing and MAC protocols, e.g., NS [6] • Application-level testing where the full application code is run within a simulated environment, e.g., TOSSIM [5] • Hardware-level emulation can be used to mirror physical device or environment constraints and reactions, e.g., Avrora [8] [9] Hardware testbeds use physical devices to run the application code, which allows for realistic conditions to be introduced into tests. Testbeds can be made entirely of physical nodes or they can partially be made from virtual nodes in what is termed a hybrid-physical simulation in which seamless, transparent interfacing is performed between physical and virtual nodes to form a hybrid network [7] [11] [12] . The operator has control over the virtual nodes and can thus affect the information fed to the physical part of the testbed. These systems offer large-scale hybrid-physical networks. The real sensor and actuator nodes can be "moved" around in the network to examine their performance as leaf-nodes, forwarding-nodes, data-sinks, etc. Virtual nodes are emulated and are seamlessly connected to the physical WS&AN in order to provide a virtual network of adequate scale or to provide virtual or augmented sensor readings (i.e., a virtual node's sensor reading, event detection and RF transmission is emulated and linked into the physical network, thus incorporating real-world network issues.
A testbed can be used either in-situ, where devices are placed in an uncontrolled environment, or in the lab or in a test-location. Alternatively, a testbed can be used in a partially controlled environment, e.g., devices can be placed in close proximity to ensure that RF communication is not out of range. This type of testing allows the operator to have control of various aspects of the system or its surroundings and is a well-known standard development procedure. A more unusual example can be found in [10] where actual environmental conditions are introduced to provide input to the sensors in the physical WS&AN to observe how the deployed network copes under various input conditions.
Testing in a partially controlled environment requires access to the deployed devices and the ability to control the phenomena being observed, e.g., turning lights on and off to excite a photo-sensor or applying heat or smoke to a fire detector. This is only feasible for simple and safe events and would not allow WS&ANs designed to detect rare or hazardous events, such as a radiation leak or a volcano eruption, to be tested. Moreover, controlled environments inherently require operator interference due to the artificial nature of testing and therefore are not suitable for in-situ full lifecycle testing of a WS&AN.
B. Monitoring
Monitoring involves collecting a selection of metrics at either centralised or distributed monitor points in the network, where they are processed and interpreted in order to predict, detect, diagnose and locate potential faults. Metrics can be based on specific information transmitted to the monitor node solely for the purpose of fault monitoring or by interpreting a node's normal periodic reports or typical volumes of data that are expected. A number of frameworks exist in the literature for monitoring, diagnosing and sometimes predicting possible faults within deployed networks. The nodes performing monitoring tasks can form part of the network, e.g., Sympathy [2] , or they can belong to a dedicated and separate infrastructure or Deployment Support Network (DSN) [3] [4] .
Although monitoring approaches exist for purposes of fault detection, there is a gap in the state of the art addressing the management of full lifecycle testing mechanisms. In particular, application-level testing, which assesses the whole system end-to-end, receives very little attention. This is particularly important for alarm-based applications, where there is little means of determining whether or not a system is still operational, and for complex applications where real deployment influences such as timing and synchronisation, scale, data processing and precision are hard to model and evaluate.
III. INTEGRITY-CHECKING FRAMEWORK
We propose the Integrity-Checking Framework with the following features.
An integrity check can be activated wirelessly without accessing the devices or affecting their surrounding environment. During an integrity check, the sensors are fed emulated data in such a way that it is transparent to the application. The emulated data may be obtained by playing back a predefined or recorded set of readings or by generating readings based on a set of rules or a model. Any actuators in the network may also be emulated; they can be set to not physically actuate but to emulate the response that actuation would achieve, e.g., a success or fault/error condition for the actuation. Network communications, application processing, instructions and responses take place as they would if the physical sensors were being used.
However, in some scenarios it may be desirable for some of the nodes to use the physical actuators and sensors during an integrity check. For example, consider a WS&AN application that detects a fire in the building. The WS&AN consists of smoke detectors, temperature and CO 2 sensors, a fire alarm and a sprinkler system. The Integrity-Checking Framework could be used to initiate a fire drill. During an integrity check, the smoke detector and sensors are fed with synthetic data that emulates conditions during a fire. Although the WS&AN should use the synthetic sprinkler actuator, it could use the physical fire alarm actuator so that the alarm is really activated when the sensor nodes report that a fire has been detected. Similarly, only a selection of the sensor nodes in the WS&AN will need to report that a fire has been detected in order to trigger a response from the WS&AN. Therefore, the majority of sensors in the network can use the physical sensor rather than the synthetic sensor. The Integrity-Checking Framework uses a set of rules that can be distributed to the nodes prior to an integrity check to inform each node whether to use the physical or synthetic sensors and actuators during a check.
The synthetic sensors and actuators require only knowledge of the phenomena that are being sensed or the device being actuated. Several techniques for substituting sensor data with synthetic data on the physical sensor node have been proposed in the literature such as Emuli [13] , TOSHILT [14] and EnviroLog [15] . However, these focus on testing and debugging applications during development. Emuli and TOSHILT do not allow the application to switch between the physical sensor and the synthetic sensor; the sensor nodes need to be reprogrammed. EnviroLog records sensor data and replays it on demand and allows limited switching between the synthetic and physical sensor. However, it is restricted to using recorded sensor readings and so, in order to simulate a rare event such as a fire, the sensor node must be exposed to the conditions of the event, which would not be possible to perform in-situ.
The benefit of using synthetic sensors and actuators to test WS&AN applications is that it is a completely softwarebased approach that is build into the operating system of the sensor and actuator nodes. This means that the framework can be used in heterogeneous networks, as it is independent of the hardware platform. In addition, this approach allows the framework to be flexible enough to allow a range of levels of testing, from simple tests such as triggering an alarm condition through to complex scenarios.
The framework is completely transparent to the application, which means that it can be used to test existing applications without modifying them. Therefore incorporating the Integrity-Checking Framework imposes no additional development cost. Furthermore, when an integrity check finishes, normal operation resumes, which means that when an integrity check is not being carried out, the framework imposes no overhead on the sensor and actuator nodes.
IV. ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTEGRITY-CHECKING FRAMEWORK
The Integrity-Checking Framework is intended to be transparent to the WS&AN application, so that applications do not need to be modified in order to enable integrity checking. In order to achieve this, the framework is integrated with the node's operating system and implements the sensor/actuator and radio interfaces. Therefore the WS&AN application interacts transparently with the Integrity-Checking Framework when invoking the sensing/actuation and communication services, as shown in Figure 2 .
The Integrity-Checking Framework consists of four components: the Sensor and Actuator Handler, the Communication handler, the Integrity Check Manager and the Synthetic Sensor and Actuator.
A. Integrity Check Manager
The Integrity Check Manager has two functions: state management and scenario control. The state management function controls when the node performs an integrity check. Integrity checks can be performed according to a hard-coded schedule or they can be initiated when a command is received over the air. In addition, this component ensures that all nodes in the network are performing an integrity check at the same time by negotiating with neighbouring nodes.
The Integrity Check Manager also contains rules for determining when to use the physical sensors and actuators during an integrity check. This controls the playback of a particular scenario. For example, in a fire detection scenario a sensor node may be set so that it uses the physical sensor for a period of time but then switches to its synthetic sensor as the simulated fire spreads. These rules can be updated over the network prior to performing an integrity test.
B. Sensor and Actuator Handler
The functionality of the Sensor and Actuator Handler depends on whether the node being tested allows sensing or actuation or both. On nodes that incorporate sensing devices, the framework mimics the sensor interface to the WS&AN application. When polled by the application, the Sensor and Actuator Handler component polls either the physical or the synthetic sensor depending on the scenario rules and whether the node is currently performing an integrity-check. The Sensor and Actuator Handler then returns the synthetic or physical reading to the WS&AN application.
On nodes that allow actuation, the Sensor and Actuator Handler also manages the Synthetic Actuator. When requested by the WS&AN application, the Sensor and Actuator Handler sets either the physical or the synthetic actuator according to the current scenario rules and state stored in the Integrity Check Manager.
When normal operation resumes after an integrity check has been performed, this component ensures that any parameters relating to the sensors and actuators are restored to their original state.
C. Synthetic Sensor and Actuator
The Synthetic Sensor contains a source of emulated sensor data, which could be an explicit data set or a model for generating emulated data. It also provides a means of updating the synthetic data set over the network so that the WS&AN response to multiple scenarios can be tested in-situ, without needing to reprogramme the nodes. The framework is flexible enough to allow any technique for generating synthetic data, such as those used by TOSHILT [14] or Emuli [13] . The Integrity-Checking Framework can also cope with several different synthetic sensors so that WS&AN applications that poll several different types of sensors, e.g., temperature and light, can be validated. The only requirement on the Synthetic Sensor component is that it conforms to the same interface as the physical sensor.
The Synthetic Actuator enables the response of the actuator to be emulated during an integrity check. It requires prior knowledge of the actuation device being emulated. The framework intercepts the WS&AN application's signal to change the state of the actuator. The Synthetic Actuator conforms to the same interface as the physical actuator. When the state of the Synthetic Actuator is changed, it performs all notification tasks that the real actuator would carry out, e.g., notification of new state to neighbouring nodes or gateway application, etc.
D. Communications Handler
The Communications Handler mimics the interface between the WS&AN application and the radio. It tags WS&AN application messages with the current state of the node i.e., whether the node is performing an integrity check. It is also able to determine the state of neighbouring nodes by checking the tag on received WS&AN application messages. This allows the node to ensure that its state is consistent with the network state, thus checking that the whole WS&AN performs an integrity check simultaneously.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Given the current state of maturity of WS&AN technology, it is understandable that most of the state-of-theart testing and validation techniques are targeted at design and development activities, rather than through-life fault detection and maintenance requirements. With increasing adoption of the technology, issues of quality assurance for WS&ANs that are tightly integrated with business processes and that implement elements of business logic will place stringent requirements for ongoing validation of such networks.
In this paper we propose the Integrity-Checking Framework to address this need. The framework enables distributed WS&AN applications to be verified in-situ by feeding the application with controlled input from synthetic sensors. This software-based approach offers a number of key benefits, including the flexibility to support different types of tests, no overhead when not in use and transparency to the applications.
As system administrators begin to make use of such functionality for validation and quality assurance of their deployments on an ongoing basis, we foresee three main issues arising. As the number of sensing and actuation devices in a deployment increases, scalability of the Integrity-Checking Framework will become an important issue. As the size of the WS&AN increases, more complex support tools for generating scenario data sets will be required. Moreover, it is likely that sensing devices will integrate several different sensors, requiring several synthetic sensor data sets. Distributing the complex sets of rules and multiple synthetic data sets to the whole network requires reliable, scalable and efficient multi-hop protocols for disseminating large files. The overhead on the network in preparation for an integrity check is therefore likely to become larger as the network size increases. In addition, ensuring that all of the devices in a network are synchronised, so that an integrity check is carried out simultaneously across the network, will become more challenging as the network size increases.
The second relates to the configuration of the tests to be run. While the framework offers great flexibility in supporting any type of test, administrators will require some understanding of the system components to design practical and meaningful tests. In the previously described example of a fire alarm test, it would be problematic if the administrator omitted to configure the sprinkler network to use a synthetic actuator during tests. Additionally, an understanding of how the in-network processing components operate is necessary for configuring which nodes should be providing synthetic readings to produce a meaningful test case for the algorithms. Methods for capturing, maintaining and presenting a description of the distributed application components could be integrated into test planning tools.
The third issue relates to the generation of test data sets. For simple tests (triggering an alarm condition, for example), very simple data sets can be compiled manually. For more complex scenarios including large number of nodes, manual compilation of data sets will become prohibitively time consuming. Support tools should therefore be developed, allowing simple scenario design and leading to automatic data set generation for each node.
Further work on all of these issues is required if system administrators are to make use of the capabilities of this Integrity-Checking Framework beyond very simple testing.
